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 International organizations (IOs) are dynamic institutions.  They must manage both 
the day-to-day responsibilities posed by running large bureaucracies and a host of more 
dramatic policy challenges.  Their memberships can change, and they often confront 
questions about their mandate and usefulness.  Despite both external and internal pressures 
to address these challenges, we know that such organizations face a myriad of barriers to 
quick, seamless adjustment. 
 Much of the international relations literature that attempts to explain international 
organizational change has focused on the drivers, and not the content, of change; thus the 
long waged battle between the liberal intergovernmentalists and the neo-functionalists 
(Moravcsik, 1998, Stone Sweet et al., 2001).   More recent attempts to focus on questions of 
institutional design have taken a decidedly rationalist tack (Koremenos et al., 2001, Abbott 
and Snidal, 1988, Nielson and Tierney, 2003, Pollack, 2003).  In this approach, states, which 
hope to resolve commitment or information problems, delegate to international 
organizations engineered to carry out their goals effectively.   While the rational design 
literature has made significant contributions to our understanding of the relationships 
between states and international organizations, its tabula rosa view of the world 
underestimates the historical and systemic constraints that shape the possible trajectories of 
change.   
 In this paper, we offer an alternative explanation for international organizational 
change, one that couples insights from organizational sociology with historical 
institutionalism.  The core argument rests on two assumptions.  First, we note that 
international institutions sit in a broader organizational ecosystem.  This ecosystem develops 
over time and can provide the building blocks of change and evolution in particular 
organizational sites.  As this ecosystem is a fundamentally social environment, understanding 
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IO change requires attention to the cultural materials that make up that environment and 
provide the building block for institutional change, as highlighted in sociological approaches.  
Second, the capacity to engage in institutional genesis is conditioned by the temporal 
sequencing of previous institutional trajectories.  Choice is bound and shaped by past 
decisions, which form the distinct branches available for future moves.  Here, insights from 
the historical institutionalist approach give us leverage over the ways in which institutions are 
likely to change and evolve.  
 From these foundational assumptions, we derive two ideal typical paths to 
international organizational change: institutional layering, and institutional incorporation.  In 
the former, an international institution can compensate for internal limitations by layering its 
perspective or goals over another organization.  In the latter, an international institution does 
a wholesale incorporation of another institution’s policies, in both form and/or content. 
While the two may at times merge or overlap in the real world of empirical examples, we 
draw out the two pathways as distinct mechanisms by which the external environment may 
open up possibilities for internal institutional change (while at the same time conditioning 
the parameters of such evolution). 
 Our ‘institutional scavenger’ perspective has important implications for 
understanding international organizational change.  Rather than assuming that political 
actors come to solutions for their functional challenges with a blank slate, or adapt in 
instrumentally abstract ways, we argue that the process of institutional change is always 
rooted in the social or cultural ecosystem within which these organizations are nested.  The 
solutions that actors reach for when challenges are perceived are in large part conditioned on 
the broader organizational ecosystem in which they find themselves.  This historically 
conditioned account means that these solutions often come with the pathologies inherent in 
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adapting previous remedies to new situations.  But it also may mean that, if successful, 
institutions can borrow the form and content of certain organizations to increase their 
legitimacy, authority, and ultimately, power. 
 As an initial effort to develop the institutional scavenger argument, we examine two 
cases of European Union institutional evolution.  In particular, we look at the relationship 
between the Western European Union and the Common Foreign and Security Policy as well 
as the development of higher education policy in light of the Bologna Process.  In both 
cases, the European Union reached outside the EU to existing, external organizational 
solutions to resolve internal policy demands.  We examine how institutional layering (in the 
Bologna Process) and institutional incorporation (in the case of the WEU) occurred and 
then assess the repercussions of this institutional pattern of change for EU governance.   
 In this paper, our empirical examples come exclusively from the EU, but we believe 
that these processes are likely to be found across all international organizations, and indeed, 
in domestic institutional settings as well.  All political institutions are both products of their 
preexisting and broader institutional ecosystem, as the historical institutionalists remind us.  
But those ecosystems are also made up of human beings and thus social, so the particular 
nature of actors’ rational approaches, and the content of how actors puzzle and solve policy 
problems, will be informed by that cultural environment, as the sociological institutionalist 
remind us.  The results may not be as functional as rationalist accounts of international 
organization design would expect.  Crafty political actors scavenge their surroundings to 
achieve their ends, but the fit of the accumulated institutional shells may not always be ideal. 
 
Accounts of Institutional Change 
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 Rationalist approaches largely assume institutional design is a conscious, purposive 
act where the design produces the outcomes desired by those empowered to determine the 
design choices (Nielson and Tierney, 2003, Koremenos et al., 2001).  In this view, interested 
national political actors engineer institutions to achieve their goals, balancing the efficiency 
possible through delegation with the potential for their IO agents to undermine those goals 
if their is too much slack in the design (Pollack, 2003).   
 Given the high costs of individual oversight, states seeking either expertise or 
commitment mechanisms therefore delegate to international organizations.  Such institutions 
then serve to promote information exchange or compliance (Abbott and Snidal, 1988).  
Depending on the issue-area, institutional design will reflect the particular goal at hand.  This 
sort of rationalist reasoning also underpins much of the earlier intergovernmentalist 
approach to European integration.  Emphasizing the relative bargaining power of the 
various EU nation-states, scholars like Moravcsik (1998) formulated approaches that drew a 
causal line from the desires of strong states through to the institutional design in Treaty law 
and onwards to the specific activities of the key European institutions.  In this account, to 
understand the ways in which the EU (as an IO) changes, we need to look to the goals of 
powerful states who determine and drive the integration process. 
 Students of the European Union have long found that the rationalist account 
explains some contours of the EU’s shape and politics (Pollack, 1997) but fits uneasily with 
other elements of the EU’s development.  One early rebuttal to the rational 
intergovernmental account of how the EU develops institutionally is Pierson’s (1996) 
historical institutionalist approach.  Pierson argued that these approaches overstated the 
extent of member-state control over the integration process, and he offers an alternative 
historical institutionalist account that situates the EU’s institutional development as a 
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process that unfolds over time.  Member-state’s preoccupation with short-term concerns, a 
plethora of unintended consequences, and instability in member-state preferences all 
conspire to move the EU in ways not foreseen or necessarily desired by its creators.  Change 
resistant decision rules and sunk costs also push the EU to develop in path dependent ways 
that are not adequately captured in the more rationalist accounts (Pierson, 1996). 
 Pierson’s insights engendered a host of new research that followed up by more 
precisely articulated accounts of how policies might be locked into institutions and produce 
unintended outcomes over time (Meunier and McNamara, 2007).   The EU became the 
focus of a historical institutionalist literature, which built upon Pierson and others to develop 
sophisticated accounts of the ways in which institutions evolve.  Nevertheless, much of this 
research has been inward looking, examining the internal politics of the EU.  In this paper, 
we hope to take many of these insights and turn them back on the interactions of actors 
internationally. 
 For our purposes, we are particularly interested in exploring the importance of two 
workhorses of historical institutionalism: institutional stickiness and temporal sequencing 
(Pierson, 2004, Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, Zysman, 1994).  In institutional stickiness, 
institutional structures often limit wholesale reform. As the policy context shifts over time, 
basic decision-rules and treaty provisions – the product of earlier hard fought political battles 
– moderate internal transformations. In the European context, for example, the pillar 
structure (and the accompanying voting procedures) has proved notoriously resilient despite 
its inherent limitations in dealing with new policy areas such as transnational terrorism or 
pan-European education.  In addition, we look to a second critical insight, which highlights 
the role that policy sequencing plays in institutional change, as decisions taken in an earlier 
temporal moment shape choices in later periods.  Research in the domestic setting has 
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shown, for example, that the construction of independent bureaucracies prior to broad 
based political incorporation influenced the usage of patronage politics (Shefter, 1977).  
Taking the concept to the international realm, we argue that sequencing effects may occur 
within the IO ecosystem.  Decisions at T=0 in one IO, may structure the possibilities in 
other IOs at T=1.  
 While building on these basic assumptions of historical institutionalism, we also draw 
upon a second line of argument that offers a counter to the rational design approach from a 
more sociological approach.  When confronting the puzzle of how institutions evolve, we 
not only want to situate them in time and place, but also in their specific cultural or social 
environment (Zucker, 1977, Meyer and Rowan, 1977, Powel and DiMaggio, 1991). From 
this viewpoint, organizations are viewed as both formal institutions and informal codes of 
conduct or social practices.  Most importantly, bureaucratic, rationalized institutions 
(regulatory agencies, firms, central banks and so on) are not assumed to be constituted by 
‘objective’ natural laws, but rather by cultural and social 'subjective' principles just as other 
areas of society (the arts, religion and non-profits) were always assumed to be (Dobbin, 
1994a).   As Dobbin states, "These works turned the prevailing rationalist approach to 
organizations on its head by arguing that supposedly universal precepts of organizational 
efficiency are simply abstractions from social practices that emerged for complex historical 
reasons" (Dobbin 1994a, 122).  Drawing on the broader social constructivist literature 
(Searle, 1995, Berger and Luckmann, 1966), scholars have depicted IOs as likewise socially 
constructed, and their practices the result of rationality, which is born of social interactions 
and experiences grounded in a specific place and time (Ruggie, 1998, Barnett and 
Finnemore, 2004). 
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 While some scholars have difficulty viewing rationalized organizations or practices as 
having both instrumental and symbolic foundations, we argue that both logics interact to 
clearly come into play in the EU’s evolution.  Political actors are highly strategic in choosing 
organizational forms and substantive policy content that will further their ends.  Crucially, 
however, historical contingencies shape the very lenses through which actors see their 
environment and formulate those 'rational' responses (Dobbin 1994b).  First, the external or 
social legitimation of certain forms of organization over others may exert a powerful force as 
compelling as functionalism (Spruyt, 1994).   It cannot be simple coincidence that the 20th 
century has witnessed the rise of IO assemblies and other parliamentary-like bodies, which 
flank bureaucratic secretariats.  Second, in other instances, while policy forms or substance 
may be quite functionally appropriate at the start, they can be adopted in a variety of settings 
by actors whose needs are quite dissimilar and for whom the reforms may not be 
functionally appropriate in a narrow efficiency sense.1   This is the case for many countries 
who adopted the organizational form and price stability policy content of central bank 
independence in the 1990s but for whom fighting inflation was a much lower need than the 
legitimacy and credibility that came from adopting that organizational form (McNamara, 
2002).   
 The overall point is simple: efficiency per se or narrowly defined is an unsatisfactory 
explanation for the development and evolution of many international (or domestic) 
institutions and policies. The point is not that these strategies are irrational because they 
involve social dynamics, but that rationality cannot be understood in isolation from the 
particular circumstances, social and historical, that the action is taken in.  The EU’s 
                                                
1 One classic sociological work on this phenomena is Tolbert and Zucker, (1983); see also Fligstein (1990). 
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institutions, like IOs more generally, are constructed within an ecological system of 
international organizations rich with alternative forms and policies.  The environment may 
provide a host of important functional stimuli, but they are interpreted socially, in 
conjunction and collaboration with other actors, and actors rarely create their institutions de 
novo. 
 In sum, once we situate the development and evolution of EU institutions into their 
broader temporal and social environments, we may begin to understand the path of 
institutional development more fully.  The institutionalist scavenger approach puts these 
historical institutionalist and sociological strands together to explain key parts of the 
evolution of the EU. 
Institutional Scavenging: 
 Our model of IO change starts with the assumption that in many cases the 
possibility of internal institutional evolution is limited.  This may be due to political 
blockages, legitimacy concerns, or resource constraints.  Faced with new policy problems, 
however, IOs and the states that they represent are unlikely to give up.  Instead, institutional 
scavenging offers a number of external pathways through which to alter IO capabilities, 
activities, and solutions.  At its most basic, scavenging occurs when external institutional 
routes are taken to achieve IO policy trajectories difficult to achieve through more organic 
development.    
 This potential bricolage has both a substantive and procedural dimension.  
Substantively, scavenging may occur on the level of the exoskeleton, whereby a scavenging 
IO takes advantage of the hard institutional structures of another organization.  This may 
include the secretariat, the formal rules, oversight mechanisms, or institutional capacities.  By 
contrast, other scavenging efforts may focus on the soft inner core.  Here, substantive policy 
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principles, ideas, and norms are targeted.  In either case, the scavenging IO looks to 
institutions and ideas developed by other IOs to fill an internal policy-making gap. 
 On the process side, scavenging may occur in at least one of two ways.  In some 
cases, the scavenging IO layers its goals and needs on top of another.  Here the two continue 
to exist in parallel but their work streams overlap.  The scavenging IO penetrates the 
complementary IO’s policy-making process so as to inject its goals.  The existence of 
institutional developments in an external setting then may reverberate in the scavenging IOs 
own internal policy process.  At the domestic level, such layering strategies have been 
identified in a number of institutional settings (Thelen, 2004, Shickler, 2001).  In the debate 
over pension reform, for example, policy makers often faced the institutional lock-in of pay-
as-you-go pensions systems, where current workers fund current retirees.  Altering such 
policies in isolation can prove politically deadly as politicians can only alter funding 
structures by absorbing the costs of current pensioners or cutting their benefits.  Policy-
makers, therefore, experimented with expanding private pension accounts to promote 
parallel institutional structures.  As these alternatives were layered on the old pension system 
they grew at a much faster pace from traditional pensions and thereby lowered the political 
costs to change.  New workers were slowly funneled into new accounts that did not depend 
on pay-as-you-go taxes, undermining political opposition to the reform of tradition pensions 
(Hacker, 2004). International layering may not only occur at the level of specific public 
policy alternatives within a single polity but also among IOs as they interact.  The 
development of best practices in transgovernmental forum such as the International 
Organization for Securities Commissions or the Basel Committee, for example, have opened 
up previously blocked policy areas for the traditional International Financial Institutions 
(Singer, 2007).  
 12 
 In other cases, the scavenging IO incorporates either the exoskeleton or the soft 
inner core directly into its operations (Thelen and Streeck, 2005).  In short, annexing the 
other IO, the scavenger takes on the traits, characteristics and/or operations of the other.  
Here, the other IO may serve as a policy incubator until the political environment is 
appropriate for internalization of the particular organizational domain by the scavenger.  
Both layering and incorporation take advantage of the foreign institutional setting as a site 
that is potentially more conducive to policy development.  Ultimately, the interaction 
between the scavenger institution and the foreign institution have the potential to 
significantly shift the internal policy trajectory.      
 While scavenging has the potential to overcome internal policy-making barriers 
within an IO, it comes with its own set of quirks and pathologies (Barnett and Finnemore, 
1999).  Most importantly, there is a significant risk that a form/function gap will emerge.  
Although the adopted formal structures or ideas may seem appropriate in the context of a 
specific functional challenge, depending on the type of scavenging, they may lack either the 
structural capacities to carry out the intended mission or the specific content that can resolve 
the policy challenge.  Over the long-term this gap may grow and disrupt the day-to-day 
operations of the host IO.  Similarly, frictions may arise between the scavenging IO and 
other participating IOs.  As the scavenger starts to dominate the relationship or direct the 
policy agenda, other IOs may balk at further cooperation.  The scavenger must then attend 
to the interests of its partners if it hopes to continue such efforts.  Finally, the host risks a 
Trojan Horse scenario, whereby the incorporated or layered party starts to dominate the 
relationship.   
 Given the potential benefits and risks to such strategy, the question then becomes 
when are such scavenging is more or less likely.  A clear boundary condition concerns the 
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density of the international institutional ecosystem (Alter and Meunier, 2009, Weber, 1994).  
Lone IOs off in social isolation from other bodies has little opportunity to engage in such 
behavior.  In short, the primordial soup must be relatively rich to support such adaptation.  
Additionally, the barriers to organic change must be high.  We would not expect IOs to 
engage in such behavior if they could easily adjust internal institutional structures or norms.  
This might include limits placed on the IO by member states under founding agreements or 
internal organizational deficits in technical expertise.   
 In the two preliminary case studies that follow, it is apparent that scavenging is 
occurring in the EU, with significant impacts on the form and direction of European 
integration.  In the first case, the development of foreign policy and defense capacity in the 
EU, we see the EU taking advantage of a very dense institutional environment and reacting 
to both NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) in ways that profoundly shape the 
evolution of the EU’s own posture.  Both the sequencing of the long historical development 
in this area, and the perceived legitimacy of preexisting organizational forms of the WEU are 
consequential for the ways in which the EU develops in the foreign policy realm.  Although 
the various IOs start out as layered, the WEU is ultimately completely submerged into the 
EU and incorporated.  In the case of education policy, the institutional ecosystem is much 
thinner, but the particular attractions of the relatively loose, ad-hoc intergovernmental 
Bologna process, which begins outside the EU system, has clear advantages for the EU and 
the highly political sensitive area of education policy.  Here, scavenging through institutional 
layering has enabled the EU to move closer to achieving some vital goals in terms of youth 
and worker mobility, without creating outspoken opposition.  However, the education area 
has not resulted in incorporation as in the case of foreign policy. 
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 The following sections sketch out these dynamic processes of institutional 
scavenging, linking the role of external institutions to the overcoming of political obstacles, 
legitimacy challenges, and resource constraints on the part of the EU. 
 
The Need to Scavenge: Limits to Defense Cooperation within the European Union 
 Since the signing of the Treaty of Rome, the European Communities have held high 
aspirations for broad-based integration.  Nevertheless, attempts to fold security cooperation 
into the EC’s remit have repeatedly met debilitating political barriers.  During the founding 
years, British opposition spelled the end of the European Defense Union, which would have 
established a supranational defense force in Europe.  A decade later, the Fouchet Plan 
pushed by France, which would have created an intergovernmental pan-European defense 
initiative, met a similar fate (Parsons, 2003).  Then again in the early 1980s, Germany and 
Italy in the Genscher-Colombo Plan attempted to expand European Political Cooperation to 
incorporate defense issues.  This was blocked by neutral EC members (e.g. Ireland, 
Denmark, and Greece) (Smith, 2004).  While the exact reason behind the failure of the EC 
to expand into defense policy shifted over time, it repeatedly confronted the limits of 
competence included in the original Treaty of Rome and the changing alignment of member 
state interests.  
The Institutional Eco-system 
 The post-war period saw a massive genesis of international organizations with tasks 
relevant to Europe.  In the security field, in particular, a number of institutions were created 
with overlapping and complementary missions.  The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) is perhaps the best known and ties the United States into a defensive alliance with 
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the continent.  While NATO long dominated the political and operational space devoted to 
security cooperation within Europe, a number of other organizations emerged and evolved.   
 Even before countries came together to sign the North Atlantic Treaty, a group of 
five European countries including Britain, France, and the Benelux adopted the Brussels 
Treaty in 1949.  The Brussels Treaty, which would soon expand to include Italy and 
Germany and be renamed the Western European Union in 1952, created a mutual defense 
commitment within Europe as well as a cooperative framework for the integration of 
security cooperation.  In its early years, the work of the WEU focused on resolving tensions 
between France and Germany in the Saar region and coordinating interactions between the 
UK and the continent.  With the referendum in the Saar region and the enlargement of the 
EC to include the UK, the WEU went dormant in the 1970s (Cahen, 1989). 
 Finally, as part of Détente, the parties involved in the Cold War formed the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.  Extending from Vancouver to 
Vladivostock, the CSCE formed the largest regional security organization in the world.  Its 
work focused on conflict resolution and prevention. 
The Adaptive DNA of the WEU 
 As the EC cast about for possible paths to European defense integration, the WEU 
enjoyed several adaptive advantages.  In contrast to both NATO and CSCE, WEU 
membership facilitated closer union.  In particular, the WEU did not include either of the 
global superpowers, freeing the organization from becoming merely a tool of hegemonic 
influence.  Perhaps equally important, the WEU did not include the neutral countries of 
Ireland, Denmark, and Greece, which repeatedly blocked security cooperation during the 
Cold War within the auspices of the EC.  The WEU constituted a site where a set of 
countries with roughly common goals could meet and exchange ideas (Cahen, 1989). 
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 In addition to its membership structure, the WEU had several institutional 
advantages over other regional fora.  Unlike NATO, the WEU Treaty had no explicit 
geographic limitation.  As a result, the WEU was not encumbered by the “out of area” 
discussion that shackled NATO.  Additionally, the WEU was a treaty-based organization 
that enjoyed its own secretariat, think tank, and parliamentary assembly.  These features 
meant that the WEU could serve as a convener for transgovernmental cooperation on 
defense issues that was supported by mechanisms of both technical expertise and democratic 
accountability.  With the repeated failure of EC efforts in the area, the WEU was the only 
European forum where defense ministers regularly met and discussed policy issues.  As these 
meetings included foreign ministers, the WEU offered an important site for a simultaneous 
conversation on foreign and security policy (Rees, 1998). 
The Reawakening of the WEU 
  During the 1980s as Détente waned, European leaders again searched for a path 
towards greater defense cooperation.  Finding political barriers to the expansion of 
European Political Cooperation under the auspices of the EC, France led an initiative to 
reawaken the WEU and build its capacity.  Starting with the Rome Declaration in 1984, the 
WEU took on a new level of significance in regional cooperation.  Biannual meetings of 
defense and foreign ministers began.   A number of standing committees were formed 
among lower level civil servants, the WEU assembly forged links to the European 
Parliament, and the secretariat began to organize a framework for European defense 
(Luoma-aho, 2004).   
 In 1987, the WEU released the Hague Platform on European Security Interests 
outlining a European Security Defense Identity (Taylor, 1994).  These discussions attempted 
to navigate a politically touchy debate about the role of European efforts vis-à-vis NATO.  
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One group of countries, spearheaded by France, hoped to create a European defense arm 
that would complement NATO.  Another group, led by the UK, pushed for a European 
defense pillar under the auspices of NATO (Luoma-aho, 2004).  The ESDI forged an 
important middle ground, highlighting key areas of cooperation for European countries 
while leaving ambiguous the NATO relationship.  In the end, countries from both camps 
supported the WEU because it could represent both visions.   
 In the early 1990s, the WEU expanded its institutional capacity and organizational 
mission.  Moving its secretariat to Brussels and consolidating its think tanks, the WEU built 
an institutional structure that could support collaboration among Europe’s defense 
ministries (Cornish, 1996).  These discussions produced the Petersberg Tasks, which spelled 
out a set of humanitarian and crisis management responsibilities including missions outside 
of Europe.  This established the WEU as more than a mutual defense treaty and an 
institution with global reach.  The document is cited as the cornerstone of an analytic 
framework for defense cooperation within Europe (Taylor, 1994).  While the WEU had no 
independent troops of its own, it had become an important site for transgovernmental 
cooperation and the development of a European defense initiative.  At the same time, the 
WEU created a planning cell with a situation center and intelligence section in the Brussels 
headquarters.  In May 1995, the WEU released the first assessment of threats to European 
security in its Common Reflection on the new European Security Condition. 
 WEU then coordinated a number of military missions during the late 1980s and early 
1990s.  Most notably, it served as the umbrella for the European embargo of Iraq and a 
series of minesweeping missions during the first Gulf War (Salmon, 1992).  The WEU, 
however, never established itself as a counterpoint to NATO within Europe.  It relied on 
“double hated” troupes and often lacked the political mandate to take charge of European 
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securities issues, a gap that became painfully clear during the Bosnian crisis.  Rather than 
establishing a European military, the WEU created a space for European leaders to develop 
a European security identity that was distinct from NATO objectives but not directly a 
challenge to them (Rees, 1998).   
The Incorporation of the WEU in the EU 
 During the Maastricht negotiations, the members of the European Union first 
formally integrated the Common Foreign and Security Policy into its mission.  The original 
CFSP pillar, however, limited cooperation to foreign or security issues that had an economic 
dimension.  As such it did not provide for an institutional structure to facilitate cooperation 
among defense ministers (Smith, 2004).  Additionally, there was no organizational capacity to 
facilitate the broader defense implications of CFSP.   
 As part of the Maastricht Treaty, therefore, the EU explicitly layered its institutional 
mission on top of that of the WEU.  In article J.4.2, the Treaty states, “the Union requests 
the Western European Union (WEU), which is an integral part of the development of 
the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which 
have defense implications. The Council shall, in agreement with the institutions of the 
WEU, adopt the necessary practical arrangements.”    
 The reliance of the EU on the WEU during the 1990s intensified.  As part of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, the Petersberg Tasks were formally incorporated into the EC aqui. 
More generally, the Treaty paved the way for full incorporation of the WEU with in the EU 
as stated in Title V, article J.7, “The Western European Union is an integral part of the 
development of the Union providing the Union with access to an operational capability 
notably in the context of paragraph 2.  It supports the Union in framing the defence aspects 
of the common foreign and security policy as a set out in this Article.  The Union shall 
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accordingly foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility 
of the integration of the WEU into the Union, should the European Council so decide.”  
Then in 1999, at a meeting of European defense ministers in Cologne, the WEU was 
formally annexed by the EU.  The WEU secretariat and think tank were transferred to the 
CFSP in 2002 and facilitated its bureaucratic expansion (Luoma-aho, 2004).   
The Quirks of a WEU Inspired EU Defense Policy 
 While the WEU, as such, ceased to exist, much of European Security and Defense 
Policy builds on its legacy.  Most important, ESDP concerns itself primarily with the 
Petersberg Tasks – humanitarian and crisis response.  The genesis of the Petersberg Tasks 
stemmed in large part from the WEU’s dance with NATO.  The WEU sought to establish 
itself as a complementary force that did not challenge the fundamental mission of NATO as 
a defensive alliance.  The WEU thus focused its efforts on non-core, out-of-area missions.   
This well-defined agenda offered the EU sensible ready made content for an embryonic 
ESDP.  But at the same time, the EU has been forced to focus its defense program on 
difficult humanitarian missions in weak states such as Congo and the Ivory Coast.  In ceding 
much of the traditional military operation to NATO, the WEU agenda shackles the EU to 
some of the most intractable conflicts across the globe.   
  Additionally, the annexation of the WEU by the EU has stymied a broader defense 
conversation in the European area.  One of the major benefits of WEU cooperation was a 
variable membership system.  In addition to the full members, a system was put in place for 
associate members.  These included key non-EU NATO countries such as Iceland, Turkey, 
and Norway.   From a transgovernmental perspective, there was very little difference 
between full and associated members.  As such it provided a unique platform for integrating 
non-EU members into a European defense conversation.  With the dissolution of formal 
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WEU structures and the imposition of EU procedures, it is much more difficult for these 
non-EU members to actively participate in the ongoing dialogue (Howorth and Keeler, 
2003). 
 The Need to Scavenge: the EU’s Higher Education Policy 
 The second area that provides an example of the process of institutional scavenging 
is higher education policy in the EU.   Education as a policy arena is of interest to European 
officials for several reasons, but it also brings with it significant barriers to 
institutionalization.  First, historically, education has played a central role in the development 
of citizenship and identity (Weber 1976).  Insomuch as there is a belief among some in 
Europe that the EU project as a whole is likely to be more successful if it has a social 
infrastructure that promotes a feeling of “we-ness” and proscribes a series of rights and 
obligations that come with European citizenship, the EU has an interest in all levels of 
education.  However, primary and secondary education are closely guarded by national, 
regional, and local political authorities and there is little appetite for aggressive movement 
into those realms.   
 The arena that therefore was the most amenable for the EU to pursue given 
potential national resistance was higher education, and indeed there was a major incentive to 
get university education under a common framework.  Arguably, facilitating the movement 
of university students across national borders for extended periods of study in universities 
out of their own member states is crucial to encouraging the development of European 
identity.  There is a perception among academics and Commission officials alike that it is the 
younger generations who, should they experience what it means to live and share in life 
outside their own member states, will be more likely to form the foundation for the 
development of a European identity.   This drove the founding of the Erasmus program, set 
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up in 1987.  Erasmus provides for reciprocal study programs (where students do not have to 
pay the fees of the university where they are visiting), stipends and credentials for exchange 
students across Europe.   At its twentieth anniversary in 2007, over 1.5 million students have 
taken advantage of Erasmus to study abroad, a relatively small percentage of students.  But 
in a sign of the importance of this area, the EU plans to double that amount, to 3 million, by 
2012, a very short span of time. 
 The dynamic some EU officials fondly hope for is captured very well in the 2002 
film, “L’Auberge Espanole,” where the narrator, Xavier, comes from France to attend 
university in Barcelona on the Erasmus program.  He lives in an apartment with students 
from all over the EU and gradually they come to learn about each other and themselves 
within the frame of being “European.”  In a voiceover at the start of the film, Xavier says:  
“When you first arrive in a new city, nothing makes sense. Everything’s unknown, 
virgin... After you've lived here, walked these streets, you'll know them inside out. 
You'll know these people. Once you've lived here, crossed this street 10, 20, 1000 
times... it'll belong to you because you've lived there. That was about to happen to 
me, but I didn't know it yet.” 
 
The film also has the characters explaining that to hold multiple identities, as Catalan, as 
Spanish, as a European, is perfectly normal and in fact desirable. 
 However, despite goals of Erasmus and the now ever increasing EU budget devoted 
to funding student exchanges, a persistent and important barrier to student mobility has 
been the lack of recognition of degrees and credits taken at universities outside of national 
borders, confusion over how to translate credits, and very different educational cycles and 
timetables that made transitioning between undergraduate and graduate studies complicated 
and awkward for students attempting to study at different points in their career across the 
EU.  It likewise made it difficult for researchers and professors hoping to apply their training 
and degrees to professional situations outside their own national academies.  Finally, when it 
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comes to creating a truly European job market, standardizing higher education and making 
more transparent and translatable the various degrees and credentials is an essential 
foundation.  These problems had to be solved, and it was not clear how to do it within the 
existing EU institutions. 
Limits to Education Cooperation within the European Union 
 Despite the obvious functional pressures for convergence, as with the area of 
national security, education policy in the European Union has traditionally been a sensitive 
and jealously guarded policy arena, falling as it does within the realm of social policy and 
engaging a host of important national values in its substance and execution.   Alongside 
these political barriers, both legitimacy issues and resource constraints further complicate the 
development of education policy.  There is no legal language in the Treaty of Rome 
establishing a common education policy, although there is language supporting vocational 
training.  Education was formally recognized, however, as an area of European Union 
competency in the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.  The European Commission’s Education and 
Culture Directorate General’s website declares that in terms of the treaty basis for education 
policy, “The role of the EU in education and training policies is a supporting one. The 
national governments of Member States are in charge of their education and training 
systems, but they cooperate within the EU framework in order to achieve common goals.”  
Maastricht’s treaty language is indicative of the constraints placed on full fledged EU action 
in this area:  “[t]he Community shall contribute to the development of quality education by 
encouraging cooperation between member states and, if necessary, by supporting and 
supplementing their action, while fully respecting the responsibility of the member states for 
the content of teaching and the organisation of education systems and their cultural and 
linguistic diversity."  
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 Moreover, beyond the legal issues, education systems have long figured prominently 
in nation-building projects, so the institutional landscape at the national level is extremely 
well developed and historically entrenched.  Likewise, some of the European universities go 
back almost a thousand years and thus present a formidably entrenched area for policy 
change.  For example, the University of Bologna, considered the oldest university in the 
western world, was founded in 1088, with the University of Paris and Oxford University less 
than 100 years behind.  The elaborate national credentialing systems for educational 
achievement have likewise extremely deep historical roots, that have evolved over centuries 
and have many stakeholders potentially resistant to changes in the form and content of the 
education systems and their credentials.  This set up a dilemma for EU policymakers: to 
achieve their dream of a Europe full of students experiencing their own  “Auberge 
Espanole” semesters, they needed to have much more mutual recognition, at a minimum, 
and ideally, standardization and convergence, in scholarly timetables and credentialing.  How 
could they do this without a developed internal EU capacity? 
The Institutional Ecosystem 
“Europe is not only that of the euro, of the banks and the economy: it must be a Europe of 
knowledge as well. We must strengthen and build upon the intellectual, cultural, social and 
technical dimensions of our continent. These have to a large extent been shaped by its 
universities, which continue to play a pivotal role for their development” 
— Sorbonne Declaration, 1998 
 
 Fortunately for the EU’s goals on student and labor mobility, and creating European 
citizens, the broader international institutional ecosystem was developing a set of initiatives 
that could provide a ready made solution to some of the EU’s problems, if EU officials 
could be strategic, creative and persuasive enough to take advantage of them.   A series of ad 
hoc conversations and efforts had been bubbling up in the 1970s and 1980s in the area of a 
European education policy (Smith, 1985).  These efforts were drive in part by national 
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leaders seeking to reform the cost and quality of their own educational systems but needing 
the legitimacy and coalitional support to do so (Haskell, 2008). 
 But the real push came in 1998, when the French Minister of Higher Education, 
Claude Allegre, convened a meeting of his peers from Germany, Italy and the UK to 
celebrate the 800th anniversary of the founding of the Sorbonne in Paris.  There, the 
ministers agreed on a Joint Declaration calling for a “Europe of knowledge” centered on its 
universities.2  Subsequently, in 1999 in Bologna, 29 ministers signed the Bologna 
Declaration, beginning the Bologna process that was to create a European Higher Education 
Area (EHEA) by 2010.  Bologna envisioned a new era for Europe, where students and 
researchers can have their credentials, work and status recognized, allowing for the 
movement across quite historically variegated education systems. 
The Adaptive DNA of Bologna 
 What advantages did Bologna have for the EU in terms of its institutional DNA?  
Overall, the impression is of an organizational form and genesis that the EU could claim was 
organic to the nation-states and to the publics in them, rather than being driven by the EU 
itself.  First, the membership structure was broad and inclusive, with 15 then members of the 
EU, the 11 then accession states, and three members of the European Economic Area (and 
Cyprus joined a little later).  The structure was quite loose, as a series of working groups 
were set up, with a nationally rotating Chair and secretariat.   The involvement was entirely 
voluntary on the part of states, not required by statute, the organizational methods were 
cooperative in the manner of the EU’s soft, “open method of cooperation”, not coercive, 
and the mechanisms of cooperation were traditional intergovernmental ones.   The overall 
impression was of a bottom up, networked type of cooperation, although clearly the national 
                                                
2 For detailed analysis of the origins of Bologna, see Corbett 2005, Ravinet 2005, de Wit 2003, Keeling 2006. 
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governments were interested and motivated to see this process unfold.  A series of 
“observers” were pulled into the institutional network, both from a grassroots level 
(National Unions of Students in Europe) as well as traditional IOs in the education field (the 
Council of Europe, and the OECD both had observers participate). 
 In terms of the content of this new organizational regime, six key areas were first 
identified as needing attention (Haskell 2008). 
1) Adoption of system of easily readable and comparable degrees; 2) Adoption of a 
system essentially based on two cycles [undergraduate and graduate level] 3) 
Establishment of a system of credits; 4) Promotion of Academic Mobility; 5) 
Promotion of European cooperation in quality assurance; 6) Promotion of a 
European dimension in higher education. 
 
As the process gained speed over the next eight years, lifelong learning, involvement of 
higher education institutions and students as “active partners,” enhancement of the 
“attractiveness” of the new European area, and doctoral studies as a new third cycle and an 
emphasis on building synergy between the EHEA and the European Research Area.  This 
last dimension was in line with the EHEA’s emerging linkage to the EU’s Lisbon Strategy, 
discussed below, and the membership expanded to 46 members.  The content of the 
initiative, as well as the form, could be argued to be ideal for adaptation by the EU into a 
European Union education policy regime, but one which looked driven by bottom up 
concerns. 
The EU’s Predatory Involvement in Education Cooperation  
 As the Bologna process began to move forward, the EU had on its doorstep a 
potential solution to the legal constraints of the EU’s treaty law.  While education 
harmonization was critical to achieving the creation of a European citizen and to promoting 
mobility of a new generation of Europeans, the EU faced serious barriers to achieving this 
goal by itself.  The Bologna process offered the EU an opportunity to overcome this 
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institutional dead end by layering the organizational structure already developing outside the 
EU onto the EU’s own DNA. 
 By the first ministerial meeting after the initial Bologna declaration, the EU had 
achieved an important foray into this realm when it was recognized as a participant, not an 
observer of the process, in contrast to other IOs involved.  The difficulties of steering this 
complex bureaucratic process challenged the intergovernmental set up, and the EU offered 
the national governments a way to move the process forward.  In particular, the EU set up a 
series of seemingly technical support structures to assist in the collection and dissemination 
of data, such as Eurydice (and information network on education, based in Brussels) and a 
journal for scholarship on European education (the European Journal of Education).  Such 
efforts were important in logistical terms as they offered ongoing bureaucracies to assist in 
formulating policies, but they also could have more subtle impacts in legitimating the EU as 
an actor on education, and as a site for authority in this area.  Such activities as Eurydice and 
the journal do this by reinforcing a seemingly benign framing of the very notion of 
“European education”, based on apolitical information gathering and diffusion.  The EU has 
also taken a role in the encouragement of various networks of social groups throughout the 
EU, who are nested within it but seem autonomous (see Haskell 2008). 
 The Effective Layering of a Scavenged Exoskeleton and its Soft Core 
 The critical stimulus to the absorption of the education area into the EU’s remit 
came with the Lisbon Strategy, however.  As the EU considered its role in broader economic 
growth and development across Europe, formulating the Lisbon Strategy in 2000, the 
emphasis on the need for a world class knowledge economy fit perfectly with the educational 
reform efforts underway.   Lisbon linked the competitiveness of the EU directly to the need 
for an upgrading in the European higher education sphere, and conceptually formulated the 
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problem and the solution at the European (not nationally segmented) level (Kaufman, 2008).  
This reframing of the issues within the EU allowed actors to think differently about their 
interests in an EU-wide education policy by creating a hook that linked to the traditional 
arena of EU activity, the economy (Fligstein and Drita, 1996, Jabko, 2006).  The EU’s new 
push, rooted in the new rhetoric of the Lisbon Strategy, resulted in the elevation of the 
Commission from participant to full membership in the Bologna Process in 2001, putting it 
on par with the member-states and making it an important driver of the institution, even as 
the Process still remains officially outside the EU legal framework. 
 The results of this institutional scavenging have been significant, both impacting the 
Bologna Process itself while having clear impacts on the EU’s abilities to achieve its goals in 
the area of student and worker mobility.  First, observers have noted the transformation of 
the Bologna Process to reflect the Lisbon strategy in both structure and norms (Striedinger 
and Uhart, 2006).   From the EU side, the Bologna Process has by many accounts succeeded 
in the goal of increasing mobility, in institutional cooperation on quality assurance and 
mutual recognition of credentials, and in the European dimension in domestic curricula, 
(Mittereder, 2008).  One change that is remarkable when placed in the context of how deeply 
rooted educational practices are is the standardization of the degree sequences, so that most 
universities in signatory countries, in most fields, use a 3 year first degree timeframe, plus 2 
year second degree (the US’s masters level), and the 3 or 4 year or plus doctoral degree, 
whereas before there were varying time cycles for degrees.  Most countries use a common 
European Credit Transfer System, and provide a “Diploma Supplement” which offers a 
standardized transcript.  A variety of more substantive efforts to require research training at 
the doctoral level and other quality assurance efforts have also gone forward. 
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Spread of the Three Cycle Structure of Higher Education Compliant with the Bologna 
Process 2006/7 
 
Source:  Eurydice, 2007 
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Overall numbers of students taking advantage of the increasingly convergent 
European educational space continues to rise as well.  The above graph depicts the overall 
rise in aggregate student mobility in the EU since the late 1980s.  But it should be 
remembered that European students who go abroad to study are still a relatively small 
percentage overall, as low as 2 percent in some countries but up to 10 percent in others.  
Interestingly, when comparing the mobility of European students with those in the US, there 
is less of a difference than one might imagine.  The percentage of US students at university 
outside their own state hovers around 18% (National Center for Education Statistics, 2004).   
While the US clearly demonstrates higher inter-state student mobility, the vast majority of 
students still remain in their home state. 
 An additional by-product of these education processes, is the increase in bi- and 
multilingualism in the EU and the spread of the use of English as the lingua franca, also, most 
notably by increases in the study of other languages in primary and secondary school years 
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(Eurostat data 2004).  Many of the ninety percent of European universities who participate 
in Erasmus now make available a selection of courses in English for these foreign students, 
who are often not native English speakers. 
The Quirks of a Bologna Inspired EU Education Policy 
 The EU has used its scavenging to overcome significant obstacles to its forward 
movement in the education area, but there are some shortcomings to this approach.  Most 
obviously, Bologna remains outside the formal acquis communautaire structure, and therefore 
may represent to some in Brussels a second best strategy.  The EU has arguably gone much 
further, much faster in this sensitive area than it would have otherwise, but what did it give 
up along the way?  For example, by confining itself to be focused at university level, with 
much less extension into primary and secondary education, it will not be able to duplicate 
the state and nation building projects of the member-states.  There are interesting spillovers, 
however, to the primary and secondary levels, as the incentives to go elsewhere to study 
outside your national borders create even more incentives for bi- and multi-lingual 
education, and for the study of English, which is becoming the lingua franca for European 
education.  
 The voluntary/intergovernmental structure of the Process, which includes 45 
countries, has focused the organization on standardizing the cycling structure of degrees.  
While this is an important achievement, it does not attempt to influence content within the 
system.  As such the EU finds itself in a highly bureaucratic exercise about credit recognition 
and semester plans, minimizing any discussion about, for example, liberal arts education in 
Europe.  While such standards debates are typical policy tasks for the EU, in the area of 
education and cultural policy, the Process limits the EU’s ability to expand into the 
construction of content that could further consolidate European identity. 
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Conclusion 
 Much of the work on international organizations has focused either on “optimal” 
descriptions of organizational management and function or on the drivers of change.  In this 
paper, we hope to spark a debate about the content of such change.  In particular, we are 
interested in the international institutional ecosystem in which IOs are embedded and how 
this ecosystem structures adaptation and evolution.  In contrast to internal mechanisms, we 
suggest the external IO environment offers building blocks for strategic actors to alter the 
context of institutional reform.  This may include the procedural rules and structures 
developed in other organizations or their ideas and principals.  Through processes of 
institutional layering and incorporation, scavenging IOs are able to turn to their external 
environment to disrupt the policy process and potentially overcome internal political 
barriers.  Because the ecosystem is a product of both long historical processes and social 
interaction, they shape the opportunities available and condition rational calculations 
concerning change.   
 Looking to the cases of defense and education policy, we have attempted to depict 
how the EU has used its external institutional setting to accomplish core governance tasks.  
While far from a comprehensive test for a model, the cases provide an initial plausibility 
prove for the argument, highlighting its core dimensions, boundary conditions, and 
pathologies.  Further research will be needed to examine our claims in other policy domains.  
A cursory look at EU governance reveals similar dynamics at work in critical areas such as 
the use of the Schengen Agreement for issues of border control and the incorporation of 
Council of Europe political rights in the Copenhagen Criteria.  In all of these areas, the 
founding treaties long circumscribed direct EU policy activity.  
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 We also do not believe that our findings should be limited to the European context.  
Clearly, the literature on comparative federalism and international diffusion both suggest that 
institutional development is often influenced by interdependent interactions with outside 
actors (Simmons et al., 2006, Scharpf et al., 1976).  An important next step, will be to 
examine IO behavior in different ecosystem environments.  How might scavenging differ in 
dense versus thin settings?  Similarly, what allows some institutions to become the 
scavenger?  In the 1950s, few would have expected the European Coal and Steel Community 
to necessarily become a dominant IO in the European ecosystem.  Finally, what are the 
conditions that activate scavenging behavior?  One promising avenue for further research 
will be to examine the policy entrepreneurs and networks that forge cross-institutional 
linkages. 
  International organizations do not exist in a bubble.  Rather, they are constantly 
interacting with other organizations in their environment, which are themselves a product of 
long-term social processes.  We believe that these interactions matter and offer an important 
source of international change.       
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